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Exploring Three Correlates of Thought Suppression:
Attention, Absorption, and Cognitive Load
Carolyn I. Vicchiullo and Dana S. Dunn
Moravian College
Previous studies evaluating the probability of successful thought suppression (attempts to rid our minds
of repeated unwanted thoughts) have relied solely upon internal mental distracters (Wegner, 1989),
characterizing thought suppression to be a controlled rather than an automatic process. As an alternative
approach, the effects of attention actively focused on limited external stimuli were studied in order to
achieve easy, effortless, and successful thought suppression. Participants included students enrolled in
undergraduate psychology courses. Experiment 1 showed that the presence of cognitive load
(computerized tests of perceptual skills) occupied conscious capacity sufficiently so that attempts to
suppress both mundane (tree) and exciting (sex) target thoughts were successful. Experiment 2 revealed
that the physiological effects of exciting thoughts (measured via electrodermal activity) were higher for
participants who were rated as having a predisposition toward successful suppression, although contrary
to the results of Experiment 1, cognitive load did not have any effect on suppression or expression of
target thoughts. Experiment 3 found that the type of cognitive load (motoric or attentional) was a factor in
achieving successful thought suppression. Collectively, these findings suggest that experience seems to
be a more effective thought distracter relative to traditional internal mental distracters, but only when
attention is captured involuntarily and by an appropriately challenging level of cognitive load.

Experience tells us that trying to willfully
eliminate an unwanted thought from our minds is an
almost impossible task. Try as we might to command
our thoughts to obey our wishes, there always seems to
be a mysterious mental force which we encounter that
sooner or later obstructs virtually every effort to
suppress a particular unwanted thought. There are
probably few of us who can triumph over the
compelling force of our mind as we helplessly ruminate
about an especially exciting event (the purchase of a
ticket to win the $50 million lottery) or an imminent
catastrophe (the fact that the winning ticket was lost!).
Indeed, research dealing with intentional and
internal mind control in this sense has led to the
conclusion that successful thought suppression is not
only difficult (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White,
1987), but also quite futile (Wegner & Erber, 1992). In
fact, the notion of incomplete thought suppression is
so widely accepted that investigation has centered
around its consequences (Wegner & Erber, 1993;
Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, Shorn, Blake & Page,
1990;) and characteristics (Wegner & Erber, 1992;
Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991; Wenzloff, Wegner &
Roper, 1988) rather than on uncovering alternative
methods of achieving successful elimination of
unwanted thoughts.

Therefore, the intention of this investigation was
to use the obstacles presented in thought suppression
research thus far as a point of departure for an alternate
approach to the dilemma of unwanted thoughts.
Drawing upon Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory
of optimal experience as a model, suppression's
counterpart, concentration, was considered to be a
viable avenue for exploration. Thus, a synthesis
between these two theories was proposed to replace the
traditional mind control suppression model, and it was
predicted that participants who were involved in a
totally cognitively-absorbing experiential activity
would find thought suppression to be (a) easy, (b)
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effortless (consequential, such that all irrelevant
material would naturally be unavailable to conscious
awareness), and (c) successful.
Experiment 1 studied the effect that the absence or
presence of cognitive load (computerized tests of
perceptual skills) exerts on attempts to suppress
mundane (tree) or exciting (sex) target thoughts.
Results confirmed that concentration overwhelmingly
promoted successful thought suppression. However,
there were far more mundane thought occurrences
recorded relative to exciting thoughts. Experiment 2
therefore addressed the unanticipated result of the first
study. First, following Wegner et al. (1990), the
physiological effects of suppression were measured.
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to clarify
whether exciting target thoughts might be
nonconsciously affecting the sympathetic nervous
system—even though conscious exciting thought
intrusions were not occurring as often as predicted. A
mirror-tracing task provided three incrementally difficult
levels of mental load. Data indicated that mundane
thoughts were associated with lower EDA activity
versus exciting ones, replicating the results found by
Wegner et al. (1990). This time, however, cognitive
load did not significantly promote thought suppression.
In addition, the absorption ability of participants
was evaluated using the Tellegen Absorption Scale
(TAS) in order to determine the possibility of a
predisposition for successful thought suppression
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Although there can be
many definitions of this personality trait, absorption is
characterized here as an openness to experience
identified by the simultaneous integration and
dissociation with task-relevant and -irrelevant stimuli,
respectively (Tellegen & Atkinson).
Since the mental load used in Experiment 2 was
motoric and suppression was unsuccessful, it was
suspected that motoric task as mental load was not
sufficiently attentional and challenging in nature to
produce successful suppression (M. D'Iorio, personal
communication, March 21, 1995; Davidson, Schwartz,
& Rothman, 1976). Consequently, Experiment 3
examined the possibility that the type of mental load
under which a participant was placed was critically
important to the validity of the focused attention
hypothesis. However, first it is necessary to understand
thought suppression as a mechanism of deliberate
mental control.
The Problem of Mind Control

It seems logical to assume that in order to suppress
an unwanted thought, all one has to do is consciously
think of something else. In support of this belief,
22

studies have shown • that when asked to suppress a
certain thought, people verbalizing their streams of
consciousness enumerate a litany of unrelated items
designed to direct their attention away from the
unwanted object (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987). However,
according to Wegner et al. (1987), such unfocused selfdistraction, though instinctively employed by subjects,
rendered successful suppression a difficult, even
unreachable goal. Repetitive cyclic thought sequences
consistently brought participants back to the unwanted
thought thereby refueling the search for new distracters
(Wegner et al., 1987). In addition, those stimuli used as
distracters (e.g., thoughts of inanimate objects, people,
places, etc.), as well as the environment in which the
suppression took place, began to take on the property
of the unwanted thoughts. These internal and external
cues were found to eventually act as reminders of the
original unwanted thought (Wegner, Schneider,
Knutson & McMahon, 1991). These findings suggested
that sooner or later effective distracters would disappear.
Introduction of an assigned single distracter improved
the ability to suppress (Wegner et al., 1987,
Experiment 2; Wegner et al., 1990), but it became
obvious that even given suitable distracters, strong
attentional powers would be essential if suppression
were to be more successful (Wegner & Schneider,
1989). Taken together, previous studies suggest that
thought suppression as a mechanism of deliberate
mental control and thought redirection is likely to be
both difficult and unsuccessful.
A Holistic Approach to Consciousness
and Attention

In early times, eagerness to adhere to scientific
methods prompted structuralists (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt
and Edward Titchener) and functionalists (e.g., William
James) to view consciousness through a reductionistic
lens. Recognition of a concept occurred only to the
extent that its elemental neurophysiological
components were understood. Attempts to explain
consciousness were based on "hard-evidence" answers to
empirical questions designed to deal with consciousness
on a basic sensory level.
More recently, Csikszentmihalyi (1978, 1990)
introduced the idea that consciousness was best
perceived as a holistic experiential phenomenon.
Csikszentmihalyi considers the person to be a selfgoverning, goal-directed system. Because the idea of
consciousness includes consideration of external stimuli
as well as an awareness of inner states, consciousness
is represented as an integration of human experience and
action.
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Central to Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory
is the fact that attention is perceived as a process that
concerns the whole person interacting with the
environment. It is seen as the psychic energy (albeit
limited) that is necessary to control the stream of
consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Glass,
Holyoak & Santa, 1979). Attention can only be given
to a certain number of features in the environment.
Thus, when the mind is fully focused, any stimuli not
occupying the focal area are left unrecognized and
unprocessed (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
Csikszentmihalyi (1978, 1990) extended these
observations to develop his theory of optimal or "flow"
experience. He believes that attention intensely focused
on a limited stimulus field leads to the exclusion of all
other material. A state of happiness, peak performance,
and a loss of self-consciousness derives from this
experiential event, all of which contributes to the total
absorption in the episode. According to
Csikszentmihalyi, such experiences must be
subjectively engrossing to an individual in order to
provide such fascination. Listening to music, writing,
mountain climbing, even watching a movie might
initiate the likelihood for an optimal experience. In
addition, once people become involved in a task that is
enjoyable or that challenges their skills to such a level
at which mastery is possible (with the appropriate
effort), a unique consequence ensues: all other
unpleasant or unwanted mental material is forgotten
while the participant is involved in this state of intense
focused attention.
In this experiential context, mental control could
be possible and even effective. If we followed William
James' advice and exercised our will to focus attention
selectively, only those stimuli that would capture
attention appropriately would have effective influence
on specific intentions (Wegner & Erber, 1993). Indeed,
this combination of consciousness and will should be
particularly effective when trying to suppress an
unwanted thought.
Experience as a Thought Distracter
Attention is the mechanism that is responsible for
selecting the particular information that will enter
consciousness. It is influenced by complex mental
operations (e.g., retrieval of memory, comparison,
deciding on a course of action) which compete for a part
of its energy, resulting in limited processing capacity
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1978). During a state of optimal
experience, attention is required to be fully and
intensely focused on a narrow stimulus field. It is

therefore possible that the cognitive energy necessary to
fuel the completion of a particular experiential task will
consume the balance of available attentional capacity.
As a result, all extraneous stimuli will automatically
be cut off from awareness—in short, simply forgotten
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). This phenomenon is
supported by self-reports of individuals who, while
engaged in a state of flow, claimed that they were able
to effortlessly forget even the unpleasant aspects of life
when in this condition (Csikszentmihalyi, 1978).
Moreover, this state of flow is compatible with the
concept that cognitive load—especially cognitive
overload (Wegner & Erber, 1993)—results in automatic
and therefore consequential thought suppression.
Attention and experience are thus related in that optimal
experience requires concentration.
Recall that the primary purpose of a thought
distracter is to redirect attention away from an unwanted
thought. In light of the previous information regarding
the state of flow, experience would seem to be an ideal
thought distracter. If external distracters (experientially
absorbing activities) replace internal distracters
(thoughts of irrelevant information necessary for the
operation of the intentional mental control paradigm),
relatively effortless and successful thought suppression
should then result.
Finally, experience as a thought distracter has two
additional advantages. First, it has the benefit of not
becoming a reminder of the original unwanted thought
(cf. Wegner, 1989; Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner &
Erber, 1992). A complete break from any associations
linked with the unwanted thought would be
accomplished. Total emersion in an activity
challenging ones skills should break the connection
with forbidden thoughts or any thoughts not connected
with the actual activity. Second, as a thought distracter,
experience completely fills up conscious capacity; there
is no room for anything else (Csikszentmihalyi, 1978,
1990). Compared to mind control which requires
intentionality and effort of thought redirection on a
metacognitive level, optimal experience bypasses 'that
process automatically eliminating unwanted thoughts.
In short, since a review of the existing literature on
thought suppression revealed unsuccessful attempts at
attaining this goal, an alternative method of achieving
successful suppression was suggested and an
experiential model of suppression was proposed. To.
that end, the following study tests the tentative
conclusion that under conditions of intense cognitive
load, thought suppression would be easily and
effortlessly achieved.-
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Experiment 1
Method

Design and Overview. The effects of
concentration on thought suppression were examined.
Specifically, the purpose of this study was to
investigate whether an experiential distracter would be
more effective in achieving successful thought
suppression than traditional internal mental distracters.
Thus, it was predicted that if conscious capacity was
intensely involved in a cognitively-absorbing
experiential activity, intrusions of target thoughts
would be successfully eliminated. Automatic exclusion
of peripheral stimuli would allow successful
suppression to occur with relatively little or no effort.
Because of the relatively subjective and experiential
nature of this theory, bringing the investigation into
the laboratory for examination presented a challenge.
Typically, most data concerning experiential studies
have been collected via the experiential sampling
method (Csikszentmihalyi 1978, 1990) in which
participants were randomly interrupted during their day
to self-report their thoughts. However, a more scientific
method of data collection was sought here in order to
yield results that were as reliable as possible.
The objective was to simulate an intrinsically
motivated activity and subjective experience by
manipulation of extrinsic variables. It was decided that
conditions of cognitive load would closely resemble the
self-absorbing task necessary to mimic real-life
concentration. Also, a slight incentive was employed to
compel participants to put as much effort into the tasks
as was objectively possible.
Two levels of thought (mundane and exciting) were
used in order to test the strength of the focused
attention paradigm. The choice of sex as an exciting
thought was based on results of a study conducted by
Wegner et al. (1990) in which the thought of sex was
shown to produce the highest level of
psychophysiological reactivity as compared to several
less exciting thoughts (e.g., dancing, subjects' mothers,
and the Dean). For purposes of this study, that effect
was generalized to include the possibility that sex as an
exciting thought would also account for the highest
number of thought occurrences among participants and
so would consequently be the most difficult to
suppress.
Participants. Forty-one undergraduates (11
males, 30 females) from introductory and upper-level
psychology classes at Moravian College, Bethlehem,
PA, volunteered to participate in the study in return for
extra credit. The mean age of participants was 24.93
(SD = 9.57). The participant pool in all experiments
24

was considered to be a good enough representative
sample of the college population necessary for the
purposes of these studies. Many of the volunteers were
enrolled in both day and evening courses. Typically, it
was not surprising to find the students enrolled in the
evening courses to be middle-aged or older in some
cases. It was therefore hoped that this variation in age
would allow for a diverse set of responses across
participants. None of the participants in this study were
interviewed for Experiment 2 or 3. Because one male
participant misunderstood the instructions and
considered every thought that entered his mind as one to
be counted, his data were discarded. Consequently, a
total of 40 participants' data were analyzed in the study.
Suppression and Load Manipulations.
Participants arrived and were interviewed individually in
separate rooms. This precaution was taken to insure
that participants were not influenced by the responses
of other participants.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions in which they were instructed to suppress
either an exciting thought (sex) or a mundane thought
(tree). Within each of these conditions, participants
were randomly assigned to one of two levels of
cognitive load. Thought targets and thought
instructions were counterbalanced across participants.
Participants in the no-load condition were merely asked
to suppress the exciting or mundane thought simply by
using any mental distraction technique they
subjectively chose. They were left to their own devices
to create a diversion that would prohibit the entrance of
the unwanted target thought into consciousness. In
addition, they were instructed to close their eyes so that
the main external stimuli available would be of an
auditory or tactile nature (following Knutson &
Lansing, 1990). Participants were asked to perform
their specific assignments for a period of 10 minutes.
After the instructions were given, the experimenter left
the room, returning only to collect the results, debrief
the participants, and to thank them for their
participation in the study.
Participants in the cognitive load condition were
also asked to suppress either an exciting or a mundane
thought; however, these participants were also told that
their perceptual abilities would be tested. Each was
placed in front of a computer terminal and required to
perform cognitive tasks assessing perceptual skills by
following instructions that were integrated into a
software package. The programmed experiments
consisted of four tests based on a combination of
elements including psychophysics (method of constant
stimuli and signal detection), feature detection (pattern
recognition) and information processing (comparing
visual and semantic information). In order to create
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additional motivation for the participants to become as
absorbed as possible in the tasks, each was told that the
other participants had no trouble in completing the
tasks in the 10 minute time period, and that their scores
would be compared with the scores of others who had
taken the tests. In actuality these tasks would take well
over the 10 minute time period to complete, but these
incentives were deemed necessary to insure motivation
to perform a cognitively-absorbing assignment in a
laboratory setting.
Volunteers were told that the results of the tasks
would be tabulated at the end of each section so that the
experimenter was not required to be present; but in
reality, participant performance was not recorded.
Participants were also informed that the software had
the capability to record their scores so they were not to
stop to record their own scores when they finished a
particular segment of the experiment. Since the
instructions in the program were self-explanatory,
participants were told to use their best judgment if they
encountered difficulty during the test period. At the end
of the 10 minute time period, the experimenter returned
to collect the results, debrief the participants, and thank
them for their participation in the experiment.
Dependent Measures. In all conditions,
participants were provided with paper and pencil, and
requested to place a check mark on the paper whenever
they experienced awareness of their target thought
breaking into consciousness. It was reasoned that
because the no-load participants had their eyes closed
and could not see the paper and pencil, these items
would not be taken as cues associated with the
unwanted thought. Similarly, because the .cognitive
load participants were visually fixated on the computer
monitor, it was not expected that the paper and pencil
would remind them of the unwanted thought.
Materials. Software, "Computer Lab for
Memory and Cognition," used for the cognitive load
condition was provided by Conduit-Laboratory in
Cognition and Perceptions, The University of Iowa,
Oakdale Campus, Iowa City, IA, 52242; Applesoft in
ROM, 48K DOS 3.

(ANOVA) was conducted on thought occurrences. A
significant main effect for thought targets was found,
F(1,36) = 14.12, p < .0009. Unexpectedly, mundane
thoughts (M = 15.80) were found to occur more
frequently than exciting thoughts (M = 3.60). As
predicted, a main effect for cognitive load was also
found to be significant, F(1,36) = 26.26. p < .0001.
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants in the load
condition experienced far fewer thought occurrences (M
= 1.04) relative to those in the no-load condition (M =
9.07). Moreover, a significant interaction between
thought target and cognitive load qualified both main
effects, F(1,36) = 14.60, p < .0008. Thought targets
interacted with cognitive load such that participants
assigned to the exciting thought and mundane thought
conditions experienced far fewer thought occurrences
when involved in a cognitively absorbing task.
However, a more substantial reduction in thought
occurrences was evident in the mundane thoughtcognitive load condition relative to the exciting
thought-cognitive load condition.

Results

No-Load

Since there were no statistically significant gender
differences, F < 1.00, p > .05, this variable will not be
discussed further. However, successful thought
suppression was indeed impressive, as the total number
of exciting and mundane thought occurrences
significantly decreased from 194 in the no-load
condition to 29 in the load condition (see Table 1).
A 2 (high vs. low cognitive load) x 2 (mundane
vs. exciting target thought) analysis of variance

Discussion
Results of this study present compelling evidence
that concentration positively facilitates suppression:
Only 13% of all thought occurrences took place in the
load condition relative to 86% in the no-load condition.
The prediction that the number of thought occurrences
in the no-load condition would be greater than the
number of thought occurrences in the load condition
was so clearly demonstrated that it may be concluded

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Thought
Occurrences as a Function of Cognitive Load
M

SD

n

Thoughts

Exciting Thoughts

10

36

3.60 2.67

Mundane Thoughts

10

158

15.80 9.41

Exciting Thoughts

10

15

1.50 1.65

Mundane Thoughts

10

14

1.40 2.27

Condition

Cognitive Load
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was so clearly demonstrated that it may be concluded
that thought suppression is unsuccessful when internal
mental distracters are used as the singular method of
mind control. At best, this technique seems to be
effective in keeping an unwanted thought at bay only
temporarily—as any number of internal distraction
strategies eventually fail to keep the target thought
totally out of awareness (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner
•et al., 1990; Wegner et al., 1991; Wegner & Schneider,
1989). When compared to a conscious effort to use
specific internal thought distracters, the experiential
model appears to be far more successful.
To further understand the effects of concentration
on suppression, participants who experienced
occurrences of the target thoughts in the load condition
were questioned about the circumstances under which
these thoughts became conscious. Of the 29 total
reported thoughts in the load condition, 13 thoughts
entered participants' awareness while the . -computer
tabulated scores and progressed to the next test.
Presumably, cognitive absorption was relaxed
sufficiently during these intermissions so that
participant's minds were not fully engaged on the
narrow stimulus field. This cognitive relaxation
allowed the target thought to creep back into
consciousness, causing suppression to fail. Even more
noteworthy was the fact that of the 20 participants
assigned to the load condition, 10 reported having no
target thoughts whatsoever during the 10 minute
period. Consideration of these supplemental facts lend
even more credibility to the experiential model of
concentration
thought
suppression.
Thus,
overwhelmingly promoted successful thought
suppression.
Suppression Explained by Capacity
Models of Attention. Why were the occurrences of
unwanted thoughts in the load condition so
significantly decreased? Two possibilities may be
considered. The first is Csikszentmihalyi's (1978,
1990) model of optimal experience (flow).
Csikszentmihalyi contends that in this state of flow,
consciousness only attends to the required amount of
stimuli necessary to carry out a particular activity.
Consequently, once attention is completely absorbed,
we are virtually unaware of anything else around us.
Further, Csikszentmihalyi maintains that when the
mind is fully engaged in an enjoyable or challenging
task, information irrelevant to the immediate objective
is simply left unprocessed. If the findings of this
current study are interpreted Csikszentmihalyi's terms,
it would seem that suppression is a natural consequence
of focused attention on a limited stimulus field. There
is no effort needed to redirect thoughts away from an
unwanted idea. As attention becomes focused on a fully
26

absorbing stimulus,. the state of consciousness is
altered. Controlled processes, which are normally
implemented by the mind on a voluntary and
intentional basis, are rendered worthless. Becoming
engaged in the task at hand involuntarily blocks
irrelevant stimuli from awareness causing successful
thought suppression occur automatically.
The second interpretation may be understood by
means of Kahneman's (1973) capacity model for
attention in selective attention tasks. Kahneman argues
that the subjective demands of a task on a person are a
fundamental component in determining whether one can
recognize and process multiple stimuli simultaneously.
Kahneman illustrates this point by maintaining that the
routine activities of driving and talking are two
relatively cognitively-undemanding tasks which are
successfully accomplished simultaneously. However,
driving in heavy traffic is more demanding, and so it
would be expected that conversation would decrease
during heavy traffic conditions.
In other words, for a stimulus to be completely
recognized and processed, Kahneman (1973) posits that
"cognitive resources" are necessary, and perceives that
these resources are limited. Further, he believes that the
more complex the stimuli, a greater amount of
cognitive resources are demanded for processing. If all
these resources are eventually exhausted, any additional
stimuli will go unprocessed—even unnoticed. In like
manner, when participants in the load condition were
presented with a demanding task (i.e., computerized
tests of perceptual skills) it is reasonable to assume
that all available "cognitive resources" were totally
consumed so that all other incoming stimuli (i.e.,
exciting or mundane target thoughts) were left
unrecognized, allowing thought suppression to occur
easily and effortlessly. Thus, the findings of this study
are consistent with Csikszentmihlayi's (1978, 1990)
theory of optimal experience and Kahneman's capacity
model for attention.
The Enigma, Examination, and
One
Elicitation of Exciting Thoughts.
unexpected result of this study demanded investigation:
exciting thoughts only accounted for 22.9% of all
thought occurrences across both load conditions relative
to mundane thoughts (77.1%). Why would exciting
thoughts be easier to suppress, even in the no-load
condition? For example, when participants were asked
to try not to think of sex, reactions ranged from "that
will be no problem at all" to "I had so many other
important things on my mind." In contrast, these
almost resistant responses were absent in the mundane
thought condition. Participants in this condition
reported a great deal of difficulty in keeping thoughts of
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a tree under control. In fact, one participant remarked
that everything she thought of reminded her of a tree.
It must be noted that sex was not randomly chosen
as the exciting target thought—there were actually two
reasons. First, sex received one of the highest ratings
for six basic semantic characteristics (i.e., concreteness,
imagery, categorizability, meaningfulness, familiarity,
and number of attributes or features; Toglia & Battig,
1978). In addition, it is also rated as one of the highest
scoring words for pleasantness. These traits, according
to Toglia and Battig, can predict the level of emotional
response expected from a particular word. Specifically,
words that have high ratings in these qualities elicit
significant emotional responses; conversely, words
with low ratings produce little or no emotional
responses.
Second, as mentioned earlier, results of a study
done by Wegner et al. (1990) found that the thought of
sex was responsible for producing. the most intense
degree of psychophysiological activity in participants
compared to several other target words (e.g., Mom, the
Dean, and dancing). Therefore, it seemed only logical to
assume that sex would produce the greatest number of
thought occurrences as well.
Assuming that all participants were honestly
reporting any occurrences of target thoughts, reason as
to why exciting thoughts were easier to suppress than
mundane thoughts could not be established. However,
suspicion arose as to whether there was any
unconscious activity resulting from the suppression of
exciting thoughts. It was therefore decided to replicate
the results of the Wegner et al. (1990) study in which
the suppression of exciting thoughts was examined.
EDA was chosen as the index of autonomic
activity since arousal can be measured by recording the
increases or decreases in skin conductance.
Relationships between attention and arousal have been
found to exist to the extent that the amount of effort
demanded by a task will affect the amount of arousal
that is experienced by a participant (Kahneman, 1973).
In addition, results of shadowing studies have indicated
that electrodermal responses were elicited in participants
who heard shock-associated words in a nonshadowed
channel (Dawson & Schell, 1982, 1983). This provided
supplementary evidence that even though participants
were not reporting high numbers of exciting thought
occurrences, they might instead be experiencing arousal
to the exciting thought.
The Link Between Cognition, Attention,
and Absorption. A final issue concerns individual
susceptibility to suppression. There is the possibility
that individual differences in personality traits may
account for why some people may be more likely to
suppress more successfully than others. It has been

proposed that the personality trait of absorption could
be considered a key characteristic possessed by people
who are successful suppressors, and that this trait
might even be used as a predictor of the best candidates
for successful suppression (D. M. Wegner, personal
communication, October 29, 1993). In addition, a
significant relationship between absorption and the
ability to focus attention has been advanced by Miller
& Foxworth (1992) as a result of their attempt to
validate the Focus Conscious Attention (FCA) scale, a
subscale of The Feelings, Reactions, and Beliefs
Survey (FRBS).
Absorption is the personality dimension defined as
the ability to experience deep involvement in
attentional processing. It is identified by the
simultaneous integration and dissociation with taskrelevant and -irrelevant stimuli, respectively, resulting
in the predisposition to enter an altered state of
consciousness (Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen &
Atkinson, 1974). Although absorption has been
neglected in the past, this quality has been brought to
the fore as a result of investigations of the attributes of
highly hypnotizable individuals. Studies indicate that
some people possess the ability to become totally
immersed in an activity so that distracting stimuli are
ignored. "Imaginative involvement," as it is called by
J. R. Hilgard (as cited in Roche & McConkey, 1990),
allows for a readiness to become unaware of events that
may divert attention from a deeply involving incident
by the intrinsic use of factors such as daydreaming, a
heightened sense of the attentional object, and
curiosity—all activated by idiosyncratic and
unconventional techniques.
Further, the relevance of absorption is illustrated
by the fact that high-absorption participants should be
able to suppress unwanted thoughts more easily relative
to low-absorption participants. Performances of highand low-absorption participants has revealed that there
are actual physiological differences between these two
groups—provided that attentional processes are stressed
at the appropriate level of cognitive demand (Davidson
et al, 1976). Under conditions that compelled
attentional resources to be willfully directed (as opposed
to effortless direction), high absorption participants
display the ability to selectively restrict the use of
cortical areas of the brain not involved in processing
relevant information. In this group, cortical areas of the
brain responsible for processing relevant information
are not stimulated (Davidson et al., 1976). For
example, if asked to be happy, high absorbers would
instinctively do the reverse and try not to be sad.
The Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS) is the
measure most often employed to assets this trait
(Roche & McConkey, 1990). It is one of eleven
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primary scales of the Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire developed by Tellegen and Atkinson
(1974; see also Tellegen, 1981, 1982). Participants are
required to furnish a "True" or "False" response to a 34item self-report measure designed to assess imaginative
activity. According to Tellegen (personal
communication, July 19, 1994), scoring is quantitative
and is measured on a continuum as indexed by the
number of "True" responses (0 - 34) to the items on the
questionnaire.
However, even though the TAS and other measures
were designed to assess this dimension of absorption
(Coan, 1972; McCrae & Costa, 1983, 1985; Tellegen,
1981, 1982; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), the extent to
which these scales can be trusted to reflect an accurate
rating of the trait has proven to be problematic. When
the TAS was developed, most studies concerning its
psychometric validity were conducted mainly on the
external component of construct validity rather than on
the substantive or structural components. Internal
reliability of the external component (r = .88 and a 30day-test-retest reliability of r = .91) has been reported
by Tellegen (1982). In addition, some have found
strong correlations between the TAS and measures of
hypnotic experiences, but only with this one
dimension. However, it is difficult to find any other
validity or reliability ratings of the TAS.
Consequently, the psychometric properties of the TAS
have been called into question. The content of the
events described in the 34 items designed to determine
absorption ability has been challenged. The perception
as to whether absorption should be considered a trait or
a state also casts doubt on how this construct should be
measured. Furthermore, differences in administration
(alone or with other items), response format
(dichotomous format or Likert-type format), length of
the scale given (short or long version), and variations
in scoring methods limit the significance of findings
from research which has used the TAS (Roche &
McConkey, 1990). But despite the shortcomings of the
TAS, it is the best instrument designed thus far for
measuring the construct of absorption. In view of these
flaws, restraint will be exercised when interpreting the
results of the TAS.
The central purposes of Experiment 2 were to (a)
test the strength of the focused attention paradigm
supported by the findings of Experiment 1, (b) replicate
the results of Wegner et al.'s (1990) study in which
exciting thoughts were found to produce the most
psychophysiological activity, and (c) assess whether
high absorbers found it easier to suppress thoughts than
low absorbers.
These ideas were tested by (a) assigning
participants to one of three incrementally difficult
28

conditions of mental load, (b) measuring EDA, and (c)
by asking participants to complete the TAS—dividing
participants into high and low absorption groups whose
thought occurrences could then be compared to their
absorption status.
It was hypothesized participants in the highest
cognitive load condition would find thought
suppression to be easier and more successful than those
in the lowest level of cognitive load. This prediction
was based on the theory that the more complex the
stimuli, the more conscious capacity is taken up for
processing thereby leaving no attentional resources
available to attend to irrelevant stimuli, that is,
unwanted thoughts (Kahneman, 1973). It was also
hypothesized that psychophysiological responses to an
exciting thought would be greater relative to mundane
thoughts as measured by participants' EDA. This
assumption developed by recognizing the possibility
that the participants in Experiment 1 might not have
been aware of any conscious exciting thought
intrusions, but were nonetheless undergoing
unconscious emotional excitation (Wegner et al.,
1990). Finally, it was predicted that a prerequisite for
successful thought suppression would be manifested by
a high score in the trait of absorption. This prediction
was based on findings of previous research that highabsorption participants were thought to be able to focus
attention totally on a particular stimulus (Miller &
Foxworth, 1992; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).

Experiment 2
Method

Participants. Forty undergraduates (9 males, 31
females) from introductory and upper-class psychology
classes at Moravian College Bethlehem, PA,
volunteered in the study in return for course credit.
Mean age of this group was 21 (SD = 5.29). None of
the participants in this study were interviewed for
Experiment 1 or 3. One participant withdrew from the
study shortly after it began; therefore, data from 39
participants were analyzed.
Procedure. Participants were seen individually by
the first experimenter who explained that participants
would be invited to complete a questionnaire, test their
motor skills, measure their ability to concentrate, and
assess the level of stress that all these tasks might
generate.
In order to assess the level (high or low) of
absorption ability, all participants were asked to
complete the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS), one of
the primary scales derived from the Multidimensional
Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen 1981, 1982;
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Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). After the questionnaire
was completed and returned to the experimenter, each
participant was led to another location and seated in a
chair which was placed in front of a mirror-tracing
apparatus.
Participants were then told that their motor skills
would be tested and were asked to perform a mirrortracing task (Humphries, Thomas & Nelson, 1991).
Participants were asked to trace the image of a star as
seen in a mirror on duplicate sheets of the star placed
perpendicular to the mirror and which could not be seen
by the participant. Incrementally challenging levels of
tracing difficulty were considered to be viable
manipulations of mental load and were designated as
follows: Tracing the stimulus clockwise with the
participant's dominant hand (low level of load); tracing
the stimulus clockwise with participant's non-dominant
hand (intermediate level of load); and, tracing the
stimulus counterclockwise with participant's nondominant hand (highest level of load).
The participant was then asked to indicate his or
her dominant hand for proper EDA electrode placement.
To assuage any apprehension about this phase of the
study, participants were apprised of the operation of the
EDA electrodes by being informed that their purpose
was to simply detect and record any changes in the
skin's electrical conductance during the experiment.
While each participant was being prepared, instructions
for the mirror-tracing task were given. The first
experimenter sat directly adjacent to the participant and
gave verbal instructions and a demonstration of how to
perform the task. The participant was asked to look at a
stimulus sheet held by the experimenter as instructions
were given by physically showing the participant the
exact direction in which they were to trace their
stimulus sheets. The experimenter kept track of the
beginning and end of each trial by placing a mark on a
transparency of the stimulus and later transferring it
onto the participant's actual stimulus sheet.
Instructions were based on the level of difficulty of
the condition to which participants were assigned.
Group 1 (low level of load) was told: "When you are
instructed, please pick up your pen with your dominant
hand, place the pen at the top of the star, like this, and
begin tracing between the lines made by the two stars
in a clockwise direction." Group 2 (intermediate level
of load) received the same instructions—except they
were asked to trace with their non-dominant hand in a
clockwise direction. Participants in Group 3 (highest
level of load) were asked to trace with their nondominant hand in a counterclockwise direction.
Participants were not given the opportunity to practice
tracing the star in order to avoid (as much as possible)

practice effects. Thought instructions and thought
targets were counterbalanced across participants.
After the participant was told that thought
instructions would be given as the experiment
progressed, a second experimenter, who operated the
computer, began the procedure by asking the participant
to "Please begin tracing, but do not think of anything."
At the end of that baseline interval, directions were
given to continue tracing and to suppress the first target
thought (e.g., "Please continue tracing but do not think
of a tree. If you think about a tree or anything
connected with a tree, please tell us"). After 2 min,
participants were given the same instructions, but were
asked to think about a tree. During the second baseline
interval, directions were given to "Please continue
tracing, but do not tell us your thoughts". Identical
thought instructions were given for the next two
periods, but the second thought target (sex) was used.
To end the experiment, participants were requested to
repeat the baseline requirements. Each participant was
fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.
EDA Measurement. Each participant's EDA
was measured by using the standard instructions
provided in the Guide for the Biofeedback Microlab
Software Package (HRM Software—Apple. version,
1989). The sensor cable was connected to the
electrodermal activity input on the Microlab Interface.
Participants' fingers were cleansed with alcohol (as
electrode conductivity gel is not advised for EDA
measurements) and the two EDA sensors (23mm
Snapon Ag/AgCI permanent electrodes) were attached
to the second and third fingers of each participants's free
hand (i.e., whichever hand was not being used to
perform the mirror-tracing task) by means of velcro
strips. Tape was used to secure the sensor cable to the
participant's hand in order to reduce sensor movement
and to insure accurate measurement. Readings were
taken every 10 sec and saved on hardcopy so that an
average of each 2 min trial could be obtained.
Following Wegner et al., 1990, EDA was recorded
throughout the study beginning with a 2 min baseline
reading during which participants were at rest and free
of task involvement. Immediately following this
baseline period, participants were requested to begin
tracing the star stimulus according to the instructions
specified for the level of mental load to which they
were assigned (low, intermediate or high). For the next
two 2 min periods, participants were asked first to
suppress (not to verbalize) and then to express
(verbalize) the first of two target thoughts (a mundane
thought, stone, or an exciting thought, sex). For this
experiment, a stone—instead of a tree—was chosen as
the mundane target thought. This follows the criteria
suggested by Toglia and Battig (1978) used in
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Experiment 1 (see Discussion for Experiment 2).
Participants were also instructed to verbalize all
occurrences of target thought intrusions. A second
baseline reading was then taken while participants were
(again) at rest. Another pair of 2 min segments ensued
during which participants followed the original
instructions with the exception of suppressing and then
expressing the second target thought. Thus, each
participant ultimately suppressed and expressed both the
mundane and the exciting thought while executing the
mirror-tracing task. A third baseline reading completed
the experiment. EDA deviation for each suppression
and expression trial was determined following Wegner
et al.'s (1990) directions to (a) take the mean of the
EDA baseline periods preceding and following each
condition and then (b) subtract the EDA condition mean
from it.
Mirror-Tracing Apparatus. The instrument
(Mirror Tracer, Model #31010, Lafayette Instrument
Co.) consisted of a horizontal metal plate with a copy
of a six-pointed star (Mirror Tracings Stars, Model
#31110, Lafayette Instrument Co.) placed on it which
was blocked from the participant's view by an
adjustable metal shield. To trace the star, participants
had to rely on the image of the star as seen in a mirror
positioned behind and perpendicular to the plate on
which the star was placed. The image of the star was
actually composed of two concentric stars—one
approximately one-quarter of an inch inside the other.
This configuration created a path within which the
participant, using a pen, was required to trace third line.
Measures consisted of the number of stars completed
and the number of errors counted. An error resulted each
time the traced line exited and then re-entered the
pathway. One point was given for any single error; five
and ten points were given respectively for perseverative
sections: 1/2 inch and 1 inch masses of uncountable,
tightly compacted errors. The length of each tracing
trial matched that of each suppression and expression
trial (2 min).
Results

Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
performed utilizing Conditions (target thoughts [sex
and tree] and thought instructions [suppression and
expression]) as repeated measures factors. Gender,
Cognitive Load Groups (low, medium, high), and
Absorption scores were used as between groups factors.
The dependent variables were EDA measurement, TAS
scores, errors and number of stimulus sheets completed
for the tracing task, and thought occurrences.
There were no statistically significant gender
differences or other between-subject effects, F < 1, p >
30

.05. A median split was performed on the TAS scores
(Mdn = 21) to create two subject groups (high vs. low
absorbers). Following Wegner et al. (1990), EDA
scores were calculated. The resulting EDA scores were
then analyzed by a 2 (high vs. low absorption) x 2
(suppress vs. express) x 2 (mundane vs. exciting)
ANOVA, where absorption served as a between-subject
factor and thought instructions and target thoughts were
repeated-measures. A within-subjects main effect for
target thought indicated that mundane thoughts were
associated with lower EDA activity than exciting ones,
replicating Wegner et al. (1990), F[1,37] = 7.27, p <
.02); however, this result was qualified by an
Absorption x Target Thought interaction, F[1,37] =
5.35, p < .03. Low absorbers had lower average EDA
activity for mundane rather than exciting thoughts,
while high absorbers had relatively higher average EDA
levels for mundane rather than exciting thoughts. A
marginally significant within-subjects effect for
thought instruction indicated that suppression was
associated with lower EDA activity than was
expression, F(1,37) = 3.51, p < .07.
Discussion

Experiment 2 produced three principle findings.
First, as predicted, participants experienced more
physiological activity from the exciting target thought
of sex than to the mundane target thought of stone. In
this respect, Wegner et al.'s (1990) study was
replicated, providing support for the assumption that
even though conscious occurrences of an exciting
thought may be low or non-existent, there still may be
some emotional responses which are generated by an
exciting thought. Such a finding hints at the
possibility that conscious (thought occurrences) and
unconscious (physiological activity) responses to
exciting thoughts may, at times, be mutually
exclusive: One does not need to be aware of the thought
of sex to respond emotionally to it. In fact, to
generalize this notion, it may be that any unconscious
subjectively arousing thought could cause an emotional
reaction which might be responsible for engendering
any number of feelings (e.g., anxiety, exhilaration, or
depression). This assumption is supported by findings
of Wegner et al.'s (1990) study which suggest that
phobias and obsessive preoccupations may be
motivated by the suppression of exciting thoughts.
The Effect of Absorption on Attention. A
second principle finding pertains to the significance of
the interaction found among EDA, absorption, and
target thoughts: EDA activity was lower for low
absorbers when they thought about a stone than when
they thought about sex, but higher for high absorbers
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when they thought about a stone rather than sex.
Further, high absorbers experienced just about as many
target thought intrusions (n = 305) as low absorbers (n
= 289). Interpretation of these data, however, has
proven to be problematic due to the ambiguous
performance of participants and the experimental nature
of previous research concerning absorption and
attention. For example, psychophysiological differences
between high- and low-absorbers have indeed been
documented—but of critical importance was the degree
of participants' attentional involvement and the
appropriate level of task demands placed on those
participants (Davidson et al., 1976).
Attentional involvement, even in a controlled
environment, may be a function of a participant's
subjective evaluation of the necessary effort needed to
be put forth in order to achieve the specific goals of an
experiment. In addition, situational circumstances (e.g.,
fatigue, preoccupation, motivation) existing at the time
of data collection may have interfered with the
attainment of an accurate measure of this variable.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that physiological
differences may be contingent upon individual
differences—a predicament which makes it difficult to
reliably interpret the data.
The relevance of the effect of absorption on
attention may also be dependent upon the type of
measurement employed. Here again, disparate results
make interpretation difficult. In studies using
biofeedback procedures to control heart rate and blood
pressure, the relevance of absorption was clearly
supported, but inconclusive results were obtained in
studies using electromyographic activity as a dependent
measure (Roche & McConkey, 1990). In other studies,
absorption was demonstrated to be irrelevant when skin
temperature was used as a dependent measure (Roberts,
Schuler, Bacon, Zimmerman & Patterson, 1975),
although it has been argued that changes in skin
conductance levels are second only to dilation of the
pupils in measuring indications of arousal (Kahneman,
1973). Finally, to further complicate matters, it is not
entirely clear what the state of arousal is exactly
measuring—what the participant is actually doing, the
effort that is being put forth to accomplish a task, or
the stress level that either of these determinants may
generate (Kahneman, 1973). In other words, is the
—
physiological activity due to mental load, unconscious
emotional reaction, or to anxiety? In view of all this
conflicting information, the interaction among EDA,
absorption, and target thoughts cannot be clearly
interpreted. Further research is needed in this area in
order to accurately determine the cause and the meaning
of such activity.

The Relationship between Attention and
Arousal. The third principle finding which approached
significance was participants' experience of greater
physiological response when they expressed a target
thought than when they suppressed a target thought.
This is important because it contradicts the results of
Wegner et al.'s (1990) study in which no main effect
was found for suppression versus expression. Increases
in skin conductance levels were recorded, but they were
apparent only during the suppression of the thought of
sex.
This puzzling difference may be explained in the
theoretical context of the Yerkes-Dodson Law (as cited
in Kahneman, 1973) which describes the correlation
between arousal and performance. In keeping with the
capacity model of attention (Kahneman, 1973), there is
a mutual relationship between attention and arousal.
Attentional demands influence the degree of arousal
experienced; conversely, the intensity of arousal
influences the allocation of attentional output in a
hierarchical manner necessary to accomplish various
activities. Recall that the participants in the expression
condition were asked to do three things: (a) To
specifically think about their assigned target thought;
(b) to perform a mirror-tracing task of a low, medium,
or high level of difficulty; and (c), to verbalize any
intrusion of the assigned target thought. Participants in
Wegner et al.'s (1990) study were requested to express
(or suppress) a target thought while verbalizing their
stream of consciousness, but were not placed under any
type of mental load—a factor which may help to
explain the difference in results. A request to express a
thought, either exciting or mundane, requires much
more intentionality and voluntary effort to command
the mind to focus on that thought as opposed to a
request to suppress that thought (see Experiment 1).
Therefore, since more effort is expended when
expressing a thought, physiological activity would be
expected to increase correspondingly with that necessary
elevated level of effort. Presumably, this is exactly
what occurred in Experiment 2 as increased arousal was
experienced by participants in the expression condition.
The Non-Significant Effect of Mental
Load on Suppression. One disappointing finding
of Experiment 2 which invites investigation is the
absence of a significant between-groups effect of mental
load on suppression. The mirror-tracing task was
chosen as a measure that could be manipulated in order
to yield three increasingly difficult levels of mental
load. Since more difficult tasks require more effort and
attention (Kahneman, 1973), it was predicted that
participants placed in the highest level of load would
allocate most of their attentional capacities to the
tracing task. The remaining cognitive resources would
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be so limited—even possibly non-existent—that
processing of any other stimuli (i.e., target thoughts)
would be impossible. Suppression would therefore
occur more easily and successfully for the participants
in the high load condition relative to the participants in
the low and medium load conditions. However, the
results did not confirm this expectation.
Dispositional attributes could account for the non'significant effect of mental load on suppression;
characteristics of the participants themselves may be
responsible for the failure of the prediction. High
absorbers tend naturally to direct their attentional
capacities toward internal events (experiential set) while
low absorbers prefer an external goal-oriented
orientation (instrumental set; Qualls & Sheehan, 1981;
Tellegen, 1981). In this experiment, verbal instructions
were given to the participants at the beginning of each
2 min trial. During each suppression-expression period,
each participant was first asked to continue tracing
while carrying out specific thought instructions. High
absorbers may have experienced those thought
instructions as a hindrance to their inclination to
become engrossed in the mirror-tracing task. According
to the prediction, this task-oriented focus should have
enabled them to suppress target thoughts, but because
their concentration may have been disrupted with each
thought instruction, this was not the case. Low
absorbers, on the other hand, should have perceived the
verbal instructions as a constant redirection of their
goal, thereby facilitating their performance in achieving
successful suppression. However, it is conceivable that
because low absorbers are externally oriented,
instructing them to perform the mirror-tracing task,
suppress or express a target thought, and to verbalize
any thought intrusions may have split their attention to
such an extent that their performance was hampered.
Consequently, any predicted effect of mental load on
suppression was prevented.
Cognitive Tasks vs. Motor Tasks. Finally,
an analysis of the type of mental load used in this
experiment may prove to be an additional possible
explanation for the lack of effect of mental load on
suppression. Recalling that computerized tests of
perceptual skills were used as mental load for
Experiment 1 and a mirror-tracing task was used as a
mental load for Experiment 2, is it possible that tests
of perceptual skills might place more of a cognitive
load on attentional processes than the mirror-tracing
task? Could there be a difference in the demand that is
required of a cognitive task versus a motor task? And if
so, could that difference be the variable responsible for
the effectiveness of the type of load used to achieve
successful thought suppression in Experiment 1, as
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well as the failure to achieve successful thought
suppression in Experiment 2?
The answer may lie in understanding mode-specific
cortical patterning. Complex brain behavior
interactions,
as
measured
by
cerebral
psychophysiological methods, have shown that
individuals vary significantly in the amount of cortical
involvement observed during attentional tasks
(Davidson et al., 1976). For example, in one
experiment conducted by Spong, Haider, and Lindsley
(as cited in Davidson et al., 1976), the greatest response
recorded for participants attending to visual stimuli
occurred in the occipital cortex, while the greatest
response recorded for participants attending to auditory
stimuli occurred in the temporal cortex. If this line of
reasoning is followed, it can be argued that the two
different types of load used in the first two experiments
affected two different cortical areas of the brain. This
distinction is important because the functions of these
cortical areas may disclose a disproportionate outlay of
effortful and noneffortful attentional performance which
may account for the contradictory results of the two
types of mental load used in the first two studies.
A review of the specific perceptual tasks used in
Experiment 1 reveals that tests such as signal detection,
feature detection, pattern recognition and comparison of
visual information were taken. These tasks required the
use of cognitive processes that included counting,
visual scanning, visual comparison, reading, and spatial
organization—to name a few. Such operations are
performed primarily by the occipital cortex (visual) and
the frontal cortex (higher mental processes), and place
an extremely heavy and sustained cognitive load on
attentional processes. In contrast, the mirror-tracing
task was much less cognitively engaging by requiring
participants to draw—a task that, with practice,
eventually allowed participants to work by rote.
Although the occipital cortex is also involved in this
process, the operation is chiefly performed by the
parietal cortex and requires not so much a cognitive,
but a motorical demand, in terms of mental load (M.
D'Iorio; personal communication, March 21, 1995).
This neuropsychological perspective fits nicely with
Kahneman's (1973) capacity model of attention: most
or all of participants' attentional resources were
consumed in Experiment 1. Therefore, the load variable
seems to explain why successful thought suppression
was achieved in Experiment 1 and not in Experiment 2.
Acoustic vs. Semantic Processing. A third
study was designed to test the notion that participants
would be able to suppress more successfully when
working under a challenging cognitive load.
Additionally, the mental load chosen for this
experiment would have to impose a heavy demand on
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the same cortical areas that were effected in Experiment
1. A task which necessitated participants to encode,
store, and retrieve stimuli would be considered to pose
an appropriate demand on cognitive resources (M.
D'Iorio, personal communication, March 21, 1995).
Consequently, depth of processing (shallow versus deep
processing) was selected as the type of mental load for
Experiment 3.
Depth of processing is a relatively simple method
of analyzing how a stimulus is encoded into memory.
Such processing can be thought of as existing on a
continuum, simple physical encoding at one end
(acoustic) and a deeper encoding (semantic) at the other
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). During acoustic encoding,
only the physical characteristics of the stimulus may
require attention (e.g., how may vowels are in a word).
Because very little processing is necessary to decide the
number of vowels in a word, the stimulus is said to be
processed on a shallow (nonsemantic) level, and
therefore imposes an almost trivial demand on
cognitive resources. In addition, stimuli processed on a
shallow level will provide a less durable memory code
so that recall of stimulus words will be poor (Craik,
1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973;
Parkin, 1984).
During semantic encoding, stimuli are processed
on a deeper cognitive level (i.e., a judgment about a
word). In order to evaluate the quality of a word, more
effort is required in terms of cognitive energy. For
example, if asked to determine whether a word is
pleasant or unpleasant, participants would need to think
about their past experiences concerning that word, what
others would think about that word, and comparisons
between the two sets of criteria. A deeper analysis of
the stimulus is therefore required resulting in a more
durable memory code and a greater rate of recall than
words processed on an acoustic level. It follows, then,
that the nature of the memory code would be an
indication of the level of cognitive processing utilized
to encode the stimulus (Craik 1979; Craik & Lockhart,
1972; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973; Parkin, 1984).
The purposes of Experiment 3 were threefold: (a)
To again replicate the results of Wegner et al.'s (1990)
study showing that subjects demonstrated higher
physiological activity when suppressing exciting
thoughts than when suppressing mundane thoughts; (b)
to assess whether high absorbers found it easier to
suppress target thoughts than low absorbers; and, (c) to
test the demands of a more cognitive load on the ability
to achieve successful thought suppression. It was
hypothesized that participants' EDA recordings would
be high during suppression periods of exciting thoughts
versus mundane thoughts; that high absorbers would be
more successful at suppression than low absorbers; and,

that depth of processing as cognitive load would
promote successful thought suppression.

Experiment 3
Method

Design and Overview. In this 2 (exciting
thought vs. mundane thought) x 2 (low cognitive load
vs. high cognitive load) design, participants were asked
to suppress either the exciting or mundane thought
while processing a tape-recorded list of 20 words (see
Appendix) on either a shallow or a deep level (Parkin,
1984). As in Experiment 2, the TAS was administered
to assess participants' level of absorption ability and
EDA was measured continuously throughout the
experiment. After hearing the word list, a distraction
task was introduced before asking the participants to
recall as many of the words on the list as possible.
Participants and Procedure. Twenty-four
undergraduates (11 males, 13 females) from
introductory and upper-level psychology Moravian
College, Bethlehem, PA, participated in the study in
return for course credit. The mean age of volunteers was
23 (SD = 6.80). Again, none of the participants in this
study were interviewed for either Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2.
Participants were seen individually and were first
asked to complete the TAS. Using the same procedure
and equipment as in Experiment 2 for measuring
electrodermal activity, EDA sensors were attached to 2
fingers of each participant's non-dominant hand. During
this time, participants were given a pre-numbered sheet
with numbers from 1 to 20 and advised of their
assignments. First, a 1 min baseline reading would be
recorded during which they were instructed not to move
or speak. Approximately 30 sec into that baseline
segment, the participants would be receiving directions
from the experimenter to listen to a tape recording of
20 words (see Appendix), spaced 3 sec apart. The task
of the low-level group was to determine whether each
word had the letter "E" in it (acoustic processing). If it
did, they were told to write a "Y" for "Yes" next to the
corresponding number on the sheet. If the word did not
have an "E" in it, they were asked to write an "N" for
"no" next to the corresponding number. The task of the
high-level group was to determine the emotional
quality of each word (i.e., if the word had a good or bad
connotation to it; semantic processing). If they thought
the word had a good connotation, participants were
asked to write a "G" next to the corresponding number;
if the word had a bad connotation, they were asked to
write a "B" next to the corresponding number.
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Additionally, participants were asked to suppress
either a mundane (tree) or an exciting (sex) target
thought. Since this experiment was designed to be
comparison of cognitive resources as explored in
Experiment 1, no expression of target thoughts was
required of the participants. The choice of mundane
target thought in this experiment was "tree" (as in
Experiment 1) rather than "stone" (as in Experiment 2).
Again, this decision was made in order to follow as
closely as possible the procedure used in Experiment 1
so that cognitive functioning could be examined.
Participants were also asked to verbalize any instances
of target thought intrusions to the experimenter while
performing their acoustic or semantic assignments.
A second and final 1 min baseline period completed
the trial, after which participants were given a
distraction task: they were asked to count up the
number of "Y", "N", "G", or "B" responses on their
respective sheets and to enter those scores in the
appropriately marked boxes. Then, the participants were
asked to recall as many of the words on the list as they
could and to write them down on the back of the sheet.
Recall time did not exceed 2 min in any case. The
experimenter then removed the EDA sensors, debriefed
the volunteers, and thanked them for their participation.
Results

This experiment investigated the hypothesis that
depth of processing would place such an appropriate and
sufficient cognitive load on attentional processes that
successful thought suppression would result. ANOVAs
were performed using cognitive load (low vs. high),
target thoughts (exciting vs. mundane), word lists,
absorption scores, and gender as between group factors.
Dependent measures consisted of EDA measurement,
thought occurrences and word recall.
To verify that there were no effects due to the two
different word lists, an ANOVA was conducted on each
of the dependent measures (i.e., recall, thought
occurrences, and EDA). As anticipated, there were no
differences (all Fs < 1.00, ps > .05).
A cognitive load x target thought ANOVA was
conducted on word recall. A significant main effect for
load was found, F(1,23) = 58.39, p < .001. As
expected, processing words on a semantic level (M =
11.40) facilitated higher recall of stimulus words than
when processed on an acoustic level (M = 6.43; Craik,
1979; Parkin, 1984). A significant main effect for a
gender x high absorption score ANOVA was also
found, F(1,23) = 16.98, p < .001, indicating that
females in this sample (M = 23.38) were higher
absorbers than the males (M = 16.64). There were no
other between-group effects.
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However, further analyses indicate that only 75%
of the participants in this study reported any thought
occurrences at all: 67% of participants in the low load
condition reported having no thought occurrences and
84% of participants in the high load condition reported
having no thought occurrences. It is also interesting to
note that EDA was elevated for both exciting (M =
+4.6) and mundane (M = +4.6) target thought groups.
Finally, more thought intrusions were experienced by
low absorbers (n = 21) than high absorbers (n = 11).
Discussion

In this Experiment, the assumption that
participants placed under low cognitive load would
report more target thoughts than participants placed
under high cognitive load was tested. Because semantic
processing allows for higher word recall due to a deeper
level of cognitive analysis (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), it
was expected . that participants in this semantic
processing group would have fewer thought occurrences
than participants in the acoustic processing condition
(Craik, 1979; Parkin, 1984). However, the results of
the ANOVA did not confirm this assumption. It
appears that because there was no significant difference
between the two groups, both semantic and acoustic
levels of processing were effective in producing thought
suppression.
This disappointing result notwithstanding, we
believe that we have gathered support for the primary
hypothesis: the nature of the cognitive load used to
facilitate successful thought suppression must be such
that it places an appropriate level of demand on
attentional resources in order to be successful. In this
respect, Experiment 3 was significant. Since 75% of all
participants reported having no thought intrusions
whatsoever, it is strongly suggested that depth of
processing indeed promoted successful thought
suppression across both load groups. To further
illustrate this point, it was discovered during
postexperimental interviews that participants in the
exciting thought condition experienced most thought
intrusions following the recognition of certain words
on the stimulus list as cues to the assigned target
thought of sex (i.e., boy, girl, and hot). Although there
was a non-significant effect of cognitive load on
thought occurrences between groups, it is important to
understand that there is still enough substantial
evidence to indicate that thought suppression was
achieved when depth of processing was used as
cognitive load. To the extent that thought suppression
is achieved when participants are placed under the
appropriate level of mental load, the findings of
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Experiment 1 were replicated, and support for the
focused attention was reinforced.
Another interesting finding in Experiment 3 was
the lack of effect of EDA measurement across both
target thought groups. The prediction that greater
physiological activity would be experienced by
participants in the exciting target thought group—
replicating Wegner et al.'s, (1990) study and our
Experiment 2—was incorrect, as EDA activity
increased in all but three cases (2 participants
experienced a decrease in EDA activity and one showed
no difference at all). Why might this have happened?
One explanation is possible in terms of
Kahneman's (1973) theoretical framework regarding the
orientation reaction (OR). The OR is a pattern of
heightened physiological responses caused by the
anticipation of a stimulus. In this experiment, the
stimulus necessary to evoke such a response would be
the task requiring participants to process the word list
on either an acoustic or semantic level. Unofficial
observations made by the experimenter who monitored
EDA activity on the computer screen confirm this
notion: In 88% of the trials, all physiological activity
increased during the period when participants were
required to process the word list, compared to decreased
levels of EDA activity recorded during pretask and
posttask periods of rest. This explanation is consistent
with Kahneman's (1973) capacity model of attention,
which posits that the amount of arousal experienced is
directly proportionate to the amount of effort invested
in a task—or in the mobilization to perform a task.
Although the mobilization effect is not typically
maintained over a long period of time, it is certainly
reasonable to presume that this
can indeed be
maintained over a period of 60 sec (the length of each
segment in Experiment 3).
In addition, time-pressure is an element that
imposes a heavy demand on resources causing increased
arousal (Kahneman, 1973). In the experiment, when
participants were given instructions, they were told that
they would hear a tape recording of word list containing
20 words, each spaced 3 sec apart, and that they needed
to make a semantic or acoustic judgment about that
word. The time-pressure that was created by this request
might have caused some additional arousal that was
recorded for this segment of the experiment. A final
comment concerns the finding that more thought
intrusions were reported by low rather than high
absorbers. It was expected that high absorbers would
suppress better than low absorbers, and this indeed was
the case. In view of this information, we must wonder
why these results were obtained in Experiment 3 but
not in Experiment 2.

In Experiment 3, participants had only two tasks:
To make decisions about some words and to suppress a
target thought. It may be that high absorbers were fully
able to utilize their preferred experiential set. These
high absorbers might have accomplished these tasks by
means of focusing their attention solely on the
stimulus words themselves. By using their ability to
narrow their focus internally on a stimulus, high
absorbers were troubled by very few, target thought
intrusions. In contrast, it is possible that low absorbers
were not able to adopt their preferred instrument set.
Because there were no external stimuli to constantly
redirect their attention to the goal at hand (processing of
stimulus words), low absorbers were not able to keep
their minds focused on those stimulus words which
allowed target thought to intrude more often. This
pattern can be supported by the fact that low absorbers
recalled fewer words (n = 72) than high absorbers (n =
118): High absorbers demonstrated relatively greater
powers of concentration than low absorbers.

General Discussion
Results of previous research suggest that thought
suppression is extremely difficult to accomplish—even
futile—if one is using self-distraction methods that are
solely dependent upon internal thought distracters
(Wegner & Erber, 1992, 1993; Wegner et al., 1987;
Wegner et al., 1990; Wenzlaff et al., 1991; Wenzlaff et
al., 1988). Nevertheless, these studies have provided
some valuable information about the techniques of
intentional mind control.
Suppression strategies have included the use of
unfocused self-distraction (thinking of an assortment of
unassigned, unrelated items; Wegner et al., 1987) and
focused self-distraction (using a single assigned
distracter; Wegner et al., 1987, Experiment 2; Wegner,
1989; Wegner et al., 1990). However, these attempts at
willful and effortful mind control have been shown to
invariably fail for several reasons. For instance, when
engaging in unfocused self-distraction methods,
unassigned distracters generated cyclic thought patterns
(Wegner et al., 1987) and environmental cues that
eventually led subjects back to the original unwanted
thought (Wegner et al., 1991). This situation
foreshadowed the unavoidable depletion of effective
thought distracters. Assigned single distracters allowed
for more successful suppression, but required the
possession and implementation of strong attentional
powers (Wegner & Schneider, 1989). Consequently,
thought suppression as a mechanism of intentional
mental control has been proven to be unsuccessful.
Another approach to conquer unwanted thoughts
was investigated in this study based on
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Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory of optimal
experience (flow). A state of flow is typically
recognized by self-reports of enjoyment, concentration,
or deep involvement described by people engaged in a
challenging task—provided the activity is not beyond
the individual's capacities (i.e., not too demanding to
provoke anxiety or not demanding enough to invite
boredom). A condition of happiness, peak performance,
and loss of self-consciousness derive from this
experiential event, all of which contribute to total
absorption in the episode. Most importantly, once a
person is experiencing this state of intense focused
attention, an altered state of awareness occurs and a
unique consequence ensues: All other unpleasant or
unwanted mental information is involuntarily
forgotten. This dimension of the flow state is a
significant by-product of the experience because it
implies that enjoyable and challenging activities require
complete attention to the task at hand, thereby leaving
no room for irrelevant material (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990). It was therefore expected that if a synthesis of
thought distraction theory (Wegner, 1989) and optimal
experience theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) could be
achieved, experience would prove to be the appropriate
thought distracter necessary to accomplish successful
thought suppression.
Experiment 1 examined whether participants would
be able to achieve successful suppression if absorbed in
an experiential and challenging activity. Cognitive load
for this study consisted of computerized tests of
perceptual skills. While performing these tests,
participants were asked to suppress either a mundane
(tree) or exciting (sex) target thought. As predicted,
concentration overwhelmingly facilitated successful
thought suppression. Although it was expected that
there would be more exciting thoughts recorded than
mundane thoughts, this result was not obtained.
Experiment 2 was therefore designed to explore the
surprising results of the first study by replicating
research conducted by Wegner et al. (1990) in which
physiological responses to exciting thoughts were
found to be significant. To that end, participants' EDAs
were recorded to measure whether exciting target
thoughts could be producing physiological arousal—
even though exciting thoughts were not breaking into
consciousness as often as expected. In addition, the
possibility that there could be a predisposition for
successful thought suppression was addressed by
evaluating the absorption ability of participants as
measured by the TAS (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).
In the second experiment, a mirror-tracing task
provided three incrementally difficult levels of mental
load. Data indicated that mundane thoughts were
associated with lower EDA activity versus exciting
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ones, replicating Wegner et al's. (1990) results.
However, cognitive load did not significantly promote
thought suppression. These findings suggested two
possibilities: (a) In contrast to the heavy and sustained
cognitive load used in Experiment 1, the mirror-tracing
task was an easier, motorical task, and so less
cognitively demanding; and (b) the amount of cortical
involvement during the performance of each task was
significantly different. This information was enough to
speculate that the load variable was the reason
suppression succeeded in the first study and failed in the
second.
Using depth of processing as cognitive load,
Experiment 3 tested the probability that the type of
mental load under which a participant was placed was
indeed of critical importance to the validity of the
focused attention hypothesis. As anticipated,
suppression was again successful. It was concluded that
the nature of the cognitive load was of critical
importance in placing the appropriate demand on
attentional resources in order to facilitate suppression.
Intentionality is the Key

Clearly, these current findings imply that under
conditions of appropriate cognitive (or mental) load,
successful thought suppression can and does occur. If
thought distracters are experiential in nature and the
demand of the mental load produced by that experience
is such that cognitive capacity is sufficiently occupied,
as well as narrowly focused, there is evidence that
unwanted thoughts can be banished from our minds.
However, the most critical factor is that attention must
be captured involuntarily or suppression will fail just
as surely as it does when intentional mind control is
attempted.
It is essential, however, to make certain that these
findings are not interpreted as evidence that in order to
rid oneself of unwanted thoughts, all one has to do is
concentrate on alternative stimuli. It is not enough to
say that one must "concentrate" on something else in
order to achieve successful thought suppression. As a
mechanism of mental control intended to direct our
thoughts elsewhere, concentration is just as susceptible
to the same frustrating characteristics and consequences
that plague suppression—provided the process is
initiated deliberately (Wegner, 1994). Thus, if
suppression is a consequence of an individual's
spontaneous absorption and interaction with
subjectively attractive or challenging elements of his or
her environment, we believe it will be successful.
The emphasis on whether control is achieved on a
voluntary or involuntary basis is an important
distinction that must be made in order to properly
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understand the implications of the current studies.
Recent research in the domain of mental control
proposes that under conditions of mental load sufficient
to reduce cognitive capacity, not only is suppression
inhibited, but the opposite of what is intended
ironically occurs (Wegner, 1994). For example, if one
is trying to sleep while under load, wakefulness will
result; if one is trying to relax under load, anxiety
develops. The theory of ironic processes seems to be
inconsistent with the results of the research contained
herein.
An understanding of what lies at the heart of the
ironic process theory will illustrate the difference
between the two theories. Wegner et al's. (1990) basic
concept asserts that there are two processes that are
implemented when mental control is desired: The
operating process, which is responsible for filling the
mind with the pertinent thoughts and sensations
necessary to achieve an intended state, and the
monitoring process, which scans the mind for mental
contents that are in opposition to that intended state.
The operating process is a conscious and effortful
operation; the monitoring process is usually an
unconscious and autonomous operation—and therefore
requires less effort. If the monitoring process finds any
undesirable contents, a situation which indicates control
failure, its job is to reinitiate the operating process so
that the intended state is restored. Because the monitor
is constantly scanning the mind for conditions of
control failure, most of the mind's resources are
continuously dedicated to being watchful for any
indications that mental control is failing. When placed
under mental load, that capacity to scan for failure is
substantially reduced, and the monitor not only searches
for incompatible contents but ironically creates them
itself.
It is logical to agree that, under cognitive load,
there could be an obvious reduction in the monitor's
ability to initiate the processes necessary to reinitiate
mental control in accordance with Wegner's (1994)
theory—but only when that control is deliberately
initiated. Intentionality is the key. Wegner (1994)
himself stresses this fact as well, going so far as to say
that the effects of the ironic process theory will not
even apply in cases where there is no intention to
control.
It can be argued, however, that mental load does
not unequivocally inhibit suppression. A clear
distinction must be made regarding the conditions under
which mental load is used in order to understand why. If
load is used in cases where willful mind control is the
goal, suppression will certainly fail. If load is
considered to be an experience in which one
spontaneously interacts with a challenging aspect of the

environment, then suppression is most likely to
succeed. Participants in all three experiments were
asked to suppress target thoughts while under cognitive
load, but in each condition, emphasis was placed on
task involvement rather than attempts at suppression.
Under these experiential conditions of mental load, any
type of willful mind control processes are bypassed,
causing suppression to be a consequence rather than a
goal.
Absorption: Relevant or Irrelevant?

The role of absorption still remains unclear.
Tentative predictions that high absorbers should be able
to suppress more easily than low absorbers have been
sustained here in only one experiment. Mention has
already been made of the controversial merit of the TAS
as a psychometrically valid instrument. But it is
possible that dispositional and situational differences
may influence the outcome of the interactions as well.
Very little research has been done concerning the
stimulus situations necessary for absorption to occur
(Roche & McConkey, 1990).
Perhaps some questions that should be addressed
regarding this characteristic are ones of individual
differences, cause and effect, and selective stimulus
suitably. Clearly, results indicate that both high- and
low- absorbers demonstrated the ability to suppress
successfully when given the proper cognitive demand
(Experiments 1 and 3). Should a high-absorber be
capable of becoming engrossed in every situation?
Must the situation be such that it offers the precise
conditions under which a high-absorber can become
sufficiently absorbed? Or could there be an interaction
of the participant's preferred mental set (instrument or
experiential) and the demand of the situation? Future
research should address these issues.
Conclusion

This study examined three correlates of thought
suppression: Attention, absorption, and cognitive load.
We have provided preliminary evidence that cognitive
load does promote successful thought suppression if it
is used as an experiential thought distracter and if it
involuntarily occupies attentional resources at an
appropriate level of challenging involvement. In order
to investigate the validity of this claim, it may be
beneficial to direct future research toward the
examination of the strength of target thoughts as well
as cognitive load. Target thoughts in this study
consisted of mentions of specific words that were to be
suppressed or expressed. Working under the assumption
that mere mentions of target thought would not prime a
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participant's consciousness sufficiently to make
suppression difficult, it would be interesting to see
what effect actual images of target words would have on
the ability to suppress under cognitive load (S.
Zaremba, personal communication, February 24,
1995). In addition, according to Palmer's study (as cited
in Best, 1992), since attentional resources diminish
proportionately as the number of stimuli are increased,
varying the set size of each condition of cognitive load
may play a role in impairing the ability to achieve
successful thought suppression, even on an involuntary
basis.
Clinical applications of these findings may help
people obtain some relief from troublesome or
recurring thoughts. Certainly implementation of the
flow experience is not being proposed as a viable
treatment for forms psychopathology. But for day-today occurrences of unwanted thoughts, becoming
engrossed in an enjoyable or challenging activity may
provide a short term respite. By recognizing times
when states of altered consciousness occur, those
particular circumstances can be deliberately sought out
and used for distraction from bothersome or even
obsessive thoughts or feelings. It is not yet known,
however, just how long or well this method will work.
It may be a matter of subjective motivation and ability.
Finally, flow experiences could be used simply to make
life more enjoyable or fulfilling. Finding an inner
experience that enriches one's life could be quite a
valuable discovery.
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Appendix
Word Lists for Experiment 3
List 1
Queen
Bread
West
Boy
Cold
East
Play
Butter
Thin
Table
Girl
North
Chair
Love
King
Lake
Hat
Pencil
Hot
Lnp

List 2
King
West
Lamp
Chair
Lake
Butter
Table
Girl
Love
Queen
Cold
North
Bread
Boy
Hat
Hot
Thin
Pencil
Play
East
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